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Ongoing ￿nancial innovation and greater information availability increase the tradability
of bank assets and reduce banks’ dependence on individual bank managers as private in-
formation in the lending process declines. In this paper we argue that this has two e￿ects
on banks, with opposing implications for banking stability. First, the hold-up problem
between bank managers and shareholders becomes less severe. Consequently, banks’ cap-
ital structure needs to be less concerned with disciplining the management. Deposits -the
most e￿ective disciplining device- can be reduced, increasing banks’ resilience to adverse
return shocks. However, limiting the hold-up problem also diminishes bank managers’
rents, reducing their incentives to properly monitor and screen borrowers, with adverse
implications for asset quality. Thus, even though the improved marketability of bank
assets allows banks to adopt a safer capital structure, the default risk of banks does not
necessarily decline.
Keywords: Marketability, Incentives, Financial Innovations, Financial Stability.
JEL Classi￿cation: G21, G28, G32.Non technical summary
In recent years banks’ ability to securitize loans has substantially improved. This made
large parts of banks’ assets marketable and enhanced outsiders ability to assess the value
of perviously opaque bank loans. Moreover, a well established secondary market for loans
provides banks’ capital owners with an e￿cient way to liquidate bank loans. For bank
managers, however, this means that their speci￿c knowledge about the true value of each
individual loan and how to ensure full repayment becomes less important. This reduced
the rent that bank managers can realize with a hold-up.
For the stability of an individual bank this has two opposing e￿ects, which this paper
contrasts in a theoretical model. On the one hand the principal-agent problem between
bank owners and the bank manager a￿ects the optimal capital structure of a bank. Fol-
lowing the ￿ndings of Diamond and Rajan (2000) the more severe the hold-up problem
is, the larger will bank owners set the fraction of deposits relative to equity in order to
discipline the manager. If ￿nancial innovations attenuate the principal-agent problem, the
optimal equity ratio increases, which improves the bank’s resilience to exogenous shocks
and thereby increases its stability. On the other hand a decline in the rent that the bank
manager can realize reduces his incentives to invest e￿ort in the screening of loan appli-
cants and in the monitoring of borrowers. Thus the quality of the loan portfolio declines
increasing the default probability of an individual bank.
Since capital owners cannot credibly commit to compensate the manager for the re-
duction in his rent, they cannot o￿set the negative incentive e￿ect and ensure e￿cient
screening and monitoring. Thus there is no way to countervail the aggravating moral
hazard of the bank manager and thereby eliminate its destabilizing e￿ect. Consequently,
improved access to loan securitization might ultimately lead to more fragile banks, even
though the reduction of the hold-up problem leads to a safer capital structure.Nicht technische Zusammenfassung
In den letzten Jahren verbesserten sich die M￿glichkeiten der Banken, Kredite zu ver-
briefen, deutlich. Hierdurch wurde ein Gro￿teil der Bankaktiva handelbar. F￿r viele dieser
Verm￿genswerte stehen hierdurch nun Marktpreise zur Verf￿gung, die eine Bewertung f￿r
Au￿enstehende transparenter und damit einfacher machen. Mit einem solchen Sekund￿r-
markt f￿r Kredite verf￿gen Kapitalgeber von Banken dar￿ber hinaus nun ￿ber eine
weitaus bessere Verwertungsm￿glichkeit von Bankassets als dies fr￿her der Fall war. F￿r
einen Bankmanager hat dies zur Folge, dass sein spezi￿sches Wissen ￿ber die Werthaltigkeit
bestimmter Kredite an Bedeutung verliert. Dies reduziert seine M￿glichkeiten durch einen
Hold-Up eine Rente abzusch￿pfen.
F￿r die Stabilit￿t einzelner Kreditinstitute hat dies zwei gegenl￿u￿ge E￿ekte, die
das vorliegende Papier im Rahmen eines theoretischen Modells untersucht. Einerseits
wird durch die Bedeutung des Prinzipal-Agenten-Kon￿iktes zwischen Kapitalgebern und
Bankmanager die optimale Kapitalstruktur einer Bank beein￿usst. Je gravierender die
Kapitalgeber das Hold-Up Problem einsch￿tzen, umso st￿rker werden sie zur Diszipli-
nierung des Bankmanagements auf eine Finanzierung durch Einlagen dr￿ngen. Nimmt
das Prinzipal-Agenten-Problem dagegen ab, so steigt die optimale Eigenkapitalquote, was
die Anf￿lligkeit der Bank f￿r exogene Schocks verringert und so zu einer gr￿￿eren Stabili-
t￿t des Kreditinstituts beitr￿gt. Andererseits sinken aber durch eine geringere erwartete
Rente auch die Anreize des Bankmanagers, gro￿es Engagement in die Kreditauswahl und
-￿berwachung zu legen. Die Qualit￿t des Kreditportfolios sinkt, was zu einem h￿heren
Ausfallrisiko der Bank f￿hrt.
Den Kapitaleignern ist es nicht m￿glich, den Bankmanager glaubhaft f￿r den Verlust
an Rente zu entsch￿digen und ihn so zu einer besseren Kreditpr￿fung und -￿berwachung
zu bewegen. Insofern besteht keine M￿glichkeit dem destabilisierenden Moral Hazard des
Bankmanagers entgegenzuwirken. Daher kann ein besserer Zugang zur Kreditverbriefungund eine hierdurch verbesserte Marktf￿higkeit von Krediten auch dann zu einer gr￿￿eren
Instabilit￿t der Banken f￿hren, wenn die Abmilderung des Hold-Up Problems gleichzeitig
zu einer sichereren Kapitalstruktur beitr￿gt.
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1 Introduction
A main determinant of banks’ capital structure is the need to mitigate the hold-up prob-
lem between bank managers and banks’ ￿nanciers.1 The problem arises because bank
managers accumulate speci￿c knowledge in the lending process which is valuable for the
bank. By threatening to quit and renegotiating their compensation, managers can extract
a part of their value added. This reduces the willingness of ￿nanciers to provide funds to
the bank and may lead to worthwhile projects not being undertaken.
Demandable deposits from multiple investors allow the hold-up problem to be reduced.
Any attempt to renegotiate with depositors would immediately trigger a bank run, as
depositors fear a reduction in their repayments. However, in contrast to equity, deposit
￿nancing runs the risk of ine￿cient liquidations, because it causes runs when bad luck
leads to asset returns that are insu￿cient to repay deposits in full. The optimal capital
structure trades o￿ these two e￿ects.
In recent decades, new technologies have signi￿cantly improved the availability of ￿rm-
speci￿c information. This has reduced private information in relationship lending. The
emergence of credit derivatives, in particular, has led to the accurate pricing of credit
risks on a variety of exposures. Hence, the speci￿c knowledge that bank managers accu-
mulate in the lending process provides less of an advantage over investors who are not
closely involved in the lending. At the same time, greater information availability and
1This argument is central to recent theories of banking, see, for example, Calomiris and Kahn (1991),
Flannery (1994) and Diamond and Rajan (2000).
1￿nancial innovations have boosted securitization, such as through asset-backed securities
and collateralized loan obligations. As a result, the tradability of bank credit has in-
creased. Taken together, these changes in the ￿nancial system have improved the value of
bank assets to outsiders. Therefore, managers’ ability to take advantage of their acquired
knowledge has fallen.
Consequently, there is less need for adopting a fragile capital structure in order to
discipline the management. This is consistent with the decline in the importance of
demandable deposit ￿nancing in recent years. For example, their share of total liabilities
at U.S. commercial banks has fallen from 21% to 8% over the last 15 years. The resilience
of banks to adverse return shocks should, therefore, improve.
However, bank managers’ rents also serve as an incentive device for providing e￿ort in
the monitoring and screening of borrowers. The improved marketability of bank assets,
and the resulting mitigation of the hold-up problem, reduce this rent. Due to the very
reason for the existence of the hold-up problem -the di￿culty of verifying managerial
performance in banks- this reduction cannot be easily o￿set through explicit compensation
schemes, such as equity or options. Managerial incentives for achieving high returns
may decline, with the consequence that the quality of bank assets deteriorates. This
undermines banking stability.
Taking these e￿ects together, this paper argues that even though the improved mar-
ketability of bank assets might cause banks to adopt a safer capital structure, the stability
of the banking sector is not necessarily enhanced, and may even decline. This is because
better marketability also undermines managerial incentives and may thus lead to a dete-
rioration in banks’ asset quality, with adverse consequences for bank risk. The worsening
of the incentives also has a negative e￿ect on the overall attractiveness of bank ￿nancing,
as their raison d’Œtre is the ability to monitor and screen borrowers.
In the remainder of this section, we brie￿y discuss related literature. In the next
2section we present a model where banks optimally use deposits to mitigate a renegotiation
problem and where asset quality depends on managerial e￿ort. In Section 3 we carry out
a comparative static analysis for changes in the marketability of bank assets. Conclusions
follow.
Related literature
The analysis is based on recent banking theory which has emphasized the di￿culty of dis-
ciplining bank managers and the merits of deposits in alleviating the ensuing problems.
Although disciplining managers is an issue for all companies, the problem is thought
to be more pronounced in the banking context because the private information con-
tained in bank loans makes common compensation schemes, such as options, less e￿ec-
tive. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) show that demandable deposits can be used to mitigate
incentive problems by providing informed investors with an incentive to monitor bank
managers. In Flannery (1994), short-term debt requires banks to come regularly to the
market to raise funds and thus has a disciplining e￿ort on managerial behavior. Our
setup is most closely based on Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001a, 2001b) who have devel-
oped a framework where deposits reduce managerial rents. As in the present paper, these
rents arise from bank managers’ ability to use their speci￿c knowledge to renegotiate their
compensation.
Our argument that an improvement in the hold-up problem may have adverse incentive
e￿ects relates to contributions which, following Grossman and Hart (1984), have shown
that the ex-post allocation of property rights a￿ects incentives ex-ante. In an application
to the bank-￿rm relationship, Rajan (1992) shows that due to the information gained
in the ￿nancing process, a bank can ex-post threat to liquidate even good projects in
order to extract the surplus from the entrepreneur. As this is anticipated, entrepreneurial
incentives are worsened (in contrast to the present paper, improvements in information
3availability would be bene￿cial in Rajan’s setting, as it makes it easier for a ￿rm to
switch to other sources of ￿nancing if faced with the bank’s liquidation threat). A related
argument is made in the context of equity ￿nancing by Burkhart, Gromb and Panunzi
(1997), who argue that creating ownership structures which exercise tight control over
managers may be detrimental, by reducing managers’ initiative.
Typically, a decline in the private information contained in bank loans and the resulting
improvement in the liquidity of bank assets are viewed as bene￿cial (for example, because
they allow for better diversi￿cation at banks). Nevertheless, several studies have also
pointed to potential costs. In Myers and Rajan (1995), asset liquidity is undesirable
as it increases the manager’s ability to trade assets against the interest of the owners.
Cordella and Yeyati (1998) show that when investors are less informed about bank assets,
banks may be more stable because interest rates are then less sensitive in risky states. In
Wagner (2006), an increase in asset liquidity induces managers to switch to still illiquid
but ine￿cient assests. The present paper di￿ers from these contributions in that adverse
e￿ects from an improved liquidity arise through its impact on bank managers’ incentives
for achieving high returns.2
2 The model
The economy lasts for two periods (t = 1;2) and there are two types of agents: bank
managers and investors. All agents are risk neutral and only care about consumption in
period 2.
Bank managers have no initial endowment but each of them has access to an investment
project. This investment project requires a ￿xed investment of $1 in t = 1 and matures in
2Our paper also relates to the discussion on information disclosure and transparency as both should
increase the marketability of assets. For example, in Chen and Hasan (2006), higher transparency of
banks can also reduce welfare by increasing the chance of contagious runs.
4t = 2. If a bank manager makes the e￿ort to monitor the project (e = 1) and completes
the project, the date 2 return of the project ~ c is uniformly distributed in [cmin;cmax]
(cmax > cmin) and hence has a density of Á(e c) = 1=(cmax ¡ cmin) = Á. If he does not make
the e￿ort to monitor (e = 0), the project’s return upon completion is lowered by ¢c > 0,
i.e., ~ c is uniformly distributed in [cmin ¡ ¢c;cmax ¡ ¢c]. Exercising the e￿ort causes a
￿xed disutility G > 0 to the manager. We assume that e￿ort is worthwhile, i.e.
¢c > G (1)
E￿ort is taken as unobservable and is hence not contractible.
Investors are each endowed with one unit of funds in t = 1. They are inferior users
of the project. Hence, if they complete the project they can only extract a fraction ¯
(0 · ¯ < 1) of its return ~ c in t = 2. If, for whatever reason, they force the premature
liquidation of the project (i.e., the project is not completed), the project’s value is ¡ with
¡ < ¯(cmin¡¢c) (i.e., the value of the project always falls if it is prematurely liquidated).
We assume that funds are scarce, that is there are more bank managers than en-
trepreneurs in the economy. This implies that, in order to have a chance of being ￿nanced,
bank managers have to promise the maximum possible return to investors in t = 2. How-
ever, their ability to do so credibly is limited because the project’s return ~ c can not be
veri￿ed.
The uncertainty about the project’s return (~ c) is revealed at the beginning of date
2. Afterwards (and before completion of the project), a hold-up problem arises because
a bank’s manager can threaten to withdraw from the project. Suppose that the bank is
fully ￿nanced by equity. Assuming that he has full bargaining power, the bank manager
can then negotiate down any initial claim equity may have to ¯e c, as this is equity’s outside
option from replacing the banker and completing the project itself. Hence, for a given
e￿ort choice e (e = 0;1), the maximum return W(e) that the bank manager can pledge





where cmin(0) := cmin ¡ ¢c, cmax(0) := cmax ¡ ¢c and cmin(1) := cmin, cmax(1) := cmax.
Demandable deposits can solve this renegotiation problem. Because a depositor can
reclaim his deposits at face value by withdrawing immediately, any incentive to enter into
renegotiations is eliminated. Moreover, a depositor must fear that others will withdraw
instead of participating in the renegotiation so that he can no longer be paid in full. Thus,
trying to renegotiate with depositors immediately triggers a run, causing the liquidation
of the investment project and leaving the bank manager with no return. Deposit ￿nancing
thus allows the bank manager to refrain credibly from renegotiating and to commit to
pay out depositors in full, if feasible. As a result, the bank’s pledgeable return increases.
However, deposits also entail costs because they cause a run when the project’s return
is low and depositors cannot be paid in full. Thus, there is a trade-o￿. On the one hand,
increasing deposits implies higher payouts to investors for when returns are su￿ciently
high to repay depositors. On the other hand, a higher level of deposits raises the probabil-
ity that the bank cannot meet the promised repayment to depositors. Since the resulting
run causes liquidation of the project, this reduces investors’ return.
More formally, if the bank manager promises a repayment D on deposits, depositors
can be paid in full if D · ~ c. If D > ~ c, they can only realize the liquidation value ¡ because








The optimal choice of ￿nancing (in terms of maximizing the pledgeable income) will
generally entail both deposits and equity. This is because raising equity besides deposits
is bene￿cial for when there are high realizations of e c. Equity’s threat from completing
the project itself may then exceed the level of deposits, allowing further payments to be
6extracted from the bank manager. The pledgeable return from a mixed capital structure











where the di￿erence to (3) arises because when e c > D=¯, equity’s threat ¯e c is larger than
the level of deposits D. In these cases, the bank manager can be forced to pay out ¯e c > D
to investors (of which D will go to depositors and ¯e c ¡ D to equity).
The timing in our economy can be summarized as follows
t=1:
1. Capital structure is chosen
2. Bank manager chooses e￿ort
t=2:
1. Uncertainty about project’s return (e c) is revealed
2. Bank manager renegotiates and bank owners may decide to run the
project themselves
3. Depositors and equity are paid; if depositors cannot be repaid, there
is a run and the project is liquidated
4. Project matures if it has not been liquidated before
Since bank managers are in competition for funds, they have to choose the capital
structure which maximizes the pledgeable return to investors, because otherwise their
chances of obtaining ￿nancing are zero. Hence, bank managers set D in (4) in order to











We restrict the subsequent analysis to cases where banks optimally choose a risky
capital structure. This is the case when D¤ > cmin(e), implying that for su￿ciently low
7return realizations there will be bank runs. Furthermore, we also require banks to raise
some funds through equity. Therefore, we assume ¯cmax(e) > D¤, i.e., for the highest









Lemma 1 For parameter values determined by (7), banks choose a mixed capital structure
with equity and deposits and there is a positive probability of a run.
We study next the bank manager’s e￿ort choice, which will depend on his rents. When
e c < D, there is a run and hence the bank manager obtains no rent. When e c ¸ D, his
rents depend on equity’s threat. When ¯e c < D, equities’ threat is below the level of
deposits and the bank manager obtains e c ¡ D. By contrast, when ¯e c ¸ D, his payout









(1 ¡ ¯)cÁdc ¸ 0 (8)
Given that e￿ort is not contractible, the bank manager only monitors if the additional rent
obtained from monitoring at least compensates the e￿ort disutility. Thus, in equilibrium
there is monitoring (e¤ = 1) if
¢R = R(1) ¡ R(0) =
Z cmax(1)
cmax(0)
(1 ¡ ¯)cÁdc ¸ G (9)
and otherwise there is no monitoring (e¤ = 0).
We de￿ne the e￿ciency E of the banking system as the sum of the expected payo￿s of







(c ¡ ¡)Ádc ¡ G (10)
8i.e., total pay-o￿s consist of the expected return on the project if it were never liquidated,
(cmax(1) + cmin(1))=2, minus the expected losses from liquidation due to runs,
R D¤
cmin(1)(c ¡







(c ¡ ¡)Ádc (11)
Note that for given D¤ we have E(1)¡E(0) > 0 because of the assumption that e￿ort is
worthwhile (¢c > G).
Besides e￿ciency, we are also interested in the stability of the banking system, which
will have repercussions when there are externalities from banking failure. We de￿ne the





3 Comparative static analysis
An improved tradability of bank assets allows bank owners to sell assets to third parties
more easily. Furthermore, reductions in the privateness of the information gained by
the manager in the lending process lower the e￿ciency losses which arise if the project is
completed without the bank manager. Therefore, in our model an improved marketability
of bank assets is re￿ected in an increase in ¯, the value of bank assets to outsiders. We
￿rst analyze the consequences of a higher ¯ for a given e￿ort choice and then turn to the
implications for e￿ort.
A higher ¯ has the e￿ect of allowing equity to extract a higher fraction of the projects’
returns in states where equity’s threat exceeds the repayments on deposits (¯e c > D).
Therefore, the return that can be pledged to investors increases, which can also be veri￿ed
3Our comparative static results also hold for the Loss Given Default (LGD), which is an alternative
measure of the externalities associated with banking failure.






cÁdc > 0 (13)
Because equity holders can now enforce repayment more e￿ciently, the increase in ¯ also





(2¯ ¡ 1)2 < 0 (14)
It is easy to see from (10) and (11) that this decline in deposit ￿nancing increases the
e￿ciency of bank ￿nancing, which is because it reduces the incidence of costly runs.
Furthermore, it also lowers banks’ probability of failure (from (12)).
Summarizing, we hence have
Proposition 1 For given e￿ort, the improved marketability of bank assets induces a less
fragile capital structure of banks and thereby enhances bank stability and e￿ciency.
However, higher marketability also has an e￿ect on the manager’s incentives to exercise
e￿ort. This is because the rents he derives for high project returns are lowered, as equity
can extract larger payments in these situations. Therefore, his gains from exercising e￿ort
are reduced.
From (9) it can be appreciated that there is a critical level ¯0 (¯0 < 1), de￿ned through
Z cmax
cmax¡4c
(1 ¡ ¯0)cÁdc = G (15)
at which a further improvement in the marketability of bank assets reduces the manager’s
gain from monitoring below the e￿ort costs G (note that for ¯ = 1, his additional rents
would be zero). Thus, if ¯ > ¯0, e￿ort can no longer be induced. Intuitively, this is
because there are then no means available for the manager to promise credibly su￿cient
rents for good performance of the project.
10The manager can also not be easily guaranteed rents through other schemes, such as for
example equity or options. Capital could always, after replacing the manager, renegotiate
with the manager (or simply dilute his equity stake). Since after his replacement the
manager’s outside option is zero, equity would still be able to extract ¯e c. E￿ectively, the
hold-up problem would then be reversed, preventing capital from promising additional
rents to the manager.
Thus, if equity were issued to the manager, this would simply by compensated in
the original renegotiation (that is, before replacement of the manager) through a higher
pay-out per unit of equity. Suppose for example that the manager has a share of ® in
equity. Capital’s pay-o￿ is then (1 ¡ ®)p, where p is the pay-o￿ the manager does per
unit of equity. Since capital’s outside option is still ¯e c, it can force the manager to pay
out (1 ¡ ®)p = ¯e c. Thus, the pay-outs per unit of equity increase with the manager’s
stake in order for the total pay-out to be constant.4
At ¯ = ¯0, a further increase in ¯ thus causes the manager to stop monitoring. As
this reduces the return on the project, the pledgeable income falls






¯cÁdc < 0 (16)
There is no impact on the bank’s capital structure, D¤, as e￿ort neither a￿ects the
marginal bene￿ts nor the marginal costs of deposit taking (equation 5).5 Bank stabil-
ity therefore declines, since the loss of e￿ort implies that there are more low states at
which bank runs occur (¼(0) ¡ ¼(1) > 0 from (12)). Moreover, as e￿ort is assumed to be
4A possibility to induce e￿ort, though, would be not to have equity at all. However, the resulting
decline in pledgeable income may exceed the e￿ort loss, and thus not allow for the project to be ￿nanced
(this will always be the case, for example, when e￿ort is not very productive (i.e., for small 4c)).
5This independence result is sensitive to our assumption that e￿ort only a￿ects the upper and the
lower limits of the distribution but leaves the density Á(c) of a given return realization c constant. If this
is not the case, then the loss of e￿ort may have an e￿ect on the capital structure through its e￿ect on
the densities in (5).
11productive, there is also a reduction in the e￿ciency of bank ￿nancing (E(0) ¡ E(1) < 0
from (10) and (11)). An increase beyond ¯0 may thus also cause disintermediation, as due
to the loss of managerial e￿ort (and hence the screening and monitoring of borrowers),
arms-length ￿nancing may start to dominate bank ￿nancing.
Summarizing, we have
Proposition 2 The improved marketability of bank assets reduces bank managers’ incen-
tives to generate high returns and thus eventually lowers e￿ort. This causes a reduction
in the pledgeable income and leads to a decline in both the stability and the e￿ciency of
the banking system.
Figures 1 and 2 summarize the e￿ects of an improved marketability of bank assets.











Figure 1 shows the impact on banks’ pledgeable incomes. For very low market values
of bank assets ¯ < b ¯ (where b ¯ is implicitly de￿ned by D¤(b ¯) = b ¯cmax(1), i.e., b ¯ =
12(¡=cmax(1)+1)=2 from rearranging (6)), there is no equity since its payo￿ would be zero as
D¤ > ¯e c for all e c. The bank’s pledgeable return is then not a￿ected by ¯. If the market
value of bank assets is somewhat higher (b ¯ < ¯ < ¯0), the bank manager also pays out
to equity. Pledgeable income then increases in ¯, as a higher ¯ allows equity to extract
more from the bank manager. Since the market value is still rather low, equity holders
do not extract much of the banks’ returns, leaving the bank managers with su￿cient
incentive to monitor the project. The pledgeable income reaches a peak at W ¤ as ¯
approaches ¯0. For market values of bank assets larger than ¯0 but below ^ ^ ¯ (where ^ ^ ¯ is
de￿ned through D¤(^ ^ ¯) = ^ ^ ¯cmin(0)), equity extracts most of the bank’s return in the high
states. The bank manager then no longer has an incentive to monitor. Therefore, at ¯0
pledgeable returns drop to W1 and afterwards increase to W2 as ¯ approaches ^ ^ ¯. For even
better marketability of bank assets (¯ > ^ ^ ¯), equity re￿nancing is su￿ciently e￿ective in
extracting rents such that it is optimal to have a safe capital structure without deposits
(formally, we have then D¤(¯) < ¯cmin(0)). Bank runs then no longer occur. Still, higher
marketability allows more to be extracted from the managers and thus W rises. Note
that the pledgeable income at ¯ = 1, W3 , may be lower or higher than W ¤, depending
on the productivity of e￿ort.
The impact on e￿ciency (not depicted) mirrors that on pledgeable income. For a given
e￿ort choice, an increase in ¯ tends to improve e￿ciency because the resulting decline in
deposits makes bank runs less likely. However, as with pledgeable income, an increase of
¯ beyond ¯0 has the e￿ect of destroying managerial incentives, with adverse consequences
for e￿ciency.
The impact of an increase in the marketability of bank assets on the probability of
default is depicted in Figure 2. As long as ¯ is lower than ^ ¯, changes in the market value
of bank assets do not a￿ect the stability of the bank. This is because in this interval there
is no repayment on equity and hence ¯ does not matter. Within the interval ^ ¯ < ¯ < ¯0,









the default probability declines since banks increase the fraction of equity re￿nancing,
which allows for sustaining lower and lower returns without incurring runs. If ¯ exceeds
¯0, expected returns fall as the bank manager stops monitoring. Therefore, banks’ default
probability increases. However, as the market value of bank assets increases even further,
banking stability improves again. When ¯ exceeds ^ ^ ¯, banks will be perfectly stable, as
they then chose a safe capital structure.
4 Conclusions
Recent changes in the ￿nancial system have improved the tradability of bank assets and
have reduced banks’ dependence on their managers. We have argued that this has two
e￿ects. On the one hand, it reduces the hold-up problem between bank managers and
shareholders. As a result, banks’ capital structure needs to be less concerned with dis-
ciplining the management. Deposits can be reduced, which has the e￿ect of increasing
banks’ resilience to adverse return shocks. On the other hand, reducing the hold-up
problem also diminishes bank managers’ rents, reducing their incentives to properly mon-
itor and screen borrowers. This has negative repercussions for asset quality. Thus, even
14though the improved marketability of bank assets allows for a safer capital structure, the
default risk of banks does not necessarily decline, and may even rise. Moreover, the loss
of managerial incentives may also contribute to an overall reduction in the e￿ciency of
bank ￿nancing.
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